Add Digest and SHA256Digest #202
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cgwalters
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src/image/digest.rs
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| /// A parsed pair of algorithm:digest as defined | ||
| /// by <https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/blob/main/descriptor.md#digests> | ||
| pub struct Digest<'a> { | ||
| /// The algorithm name (e.g. sha256, sha512) | ||
| pub algorithm: &'a str, | ||
| /// The algorithm component (lowercase hexadecimal) | ||
| pub value: &'a str, | ||
| } |
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Do we want to use derive in the same way as for other structures within this crate? Like the getters?
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I think it makes total sense to only expose a getter to disallow (accidental) mutation of the values to become invalid states (though, IMO, you'd rather have to work to make that accident happen; I don't know what a programmer would be thinking to end up with &mut Digest).
I battled the getset crate for a bit and I couldn't figure out how to convince it not to add an extra & reference on the getter, so I ended up just doing getters manually. (And dropped the pub from the values).
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This addresses youki-dev#201 add starts parsing digests in a stricter way. We now reject malformed digests (notably including ones with `/` which is my biggest concern) making them always safe to use as a file name. For example in some cases (e.g. ocidir-rs) I want to write a descriptor to the filesystem, and I don't want any possibility of path traversal attacks from someone including a `/` in a descriptor. We also add accessors to retrieve strictly validated SHA-256 as that's really the only important case (while still supporting other generic digests). Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <[email protected]>
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saschagrunert
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Aug 30, 2024
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This addresses #201
add starts parsing digests in a stricter way. We now reject
malformed digests (notably including ones with
/which is mybiggest concern) making them always safe to use as a file name.
For example in some cases (e.g. ocidir-rs) I want to write a descriptor
to the filesystem, and I don't want any possibility of path traversal
attacks from someone including a
/in a descriptor.We also add accessors to retrieve strictly validated SHA-256
as that's really the only important case (while still supporting
other generic digests).
Signed-off-by: Colin Walters [email protected]