Attacker goals #35

mnm678 · 2020-08-27T19:42:10Z

This reopens #20 on the new branch.

Signed-off-by: Justin Cappos <[email protected]>

Co-authored-by: Marina Moore <[email protected]>

SteveLasker

General comment to refer to artifacts, and not just images as we'll want to secure Helm, WASM, Singularity and others.

sudo-bmitch

Thanks for capturing these @mnm678. I've done the best I can to rephrase things to align with Notary/Container terms, but please feel free to improve on my wording.

sudo-bmitch · 2021-04-10T01:09:42Z

threatmodel.md

@@ -10,3 +10,10 @@ It is assumed that an attacker may perform one or more the following actions:

 While it is not always possible to protect against all scenarios, the system should to the extent possible mitigate and/or reduce the damage caused by a successful attack, detect the occurrence of an attack and notify appropriate parties, yet remain usable for parties operating the system.  Furthermore, the system should recover from successful attacks in a way that presents low operational overhead and risk to users.

+Attacker Goals:
+1. Trying to have a party install a malicious image under the attackers control.


I'd change "install" to "deploy" to better align with container terminology.

sudo-bmitch · 2021-04-10T01:11:47Z

threatmodel.md

@@ -10,3 +10,10 @@ It is assumed that an attacker may perform one or more the following actions:

 While it is not always possible to protect against all scenarios, the system should to the extent possible mitigate and/or reduce the damage caused by a successful attack, detect the occurrence of an attack and notify appropriate parties, yet remain usable for parties operating the system.  Furthermore, the system should recover from successful attacks in a way that presents low operational overhead and risk to users.

+Attacker Goals:
+1. Trying to have a party install a malicious image under the attackers control.
+2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image.  For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.


Change "an outdated image" to "an image who's signature has been revoked by the signer" or something to that effect. That avoids us defining what outdated is, leaving the definition up to the signer to determine and implement according to their own policies.

sudo-bmitch · 2021-04-10T01:13:54Z

threatmodel.md

+Attacker Goals:
+1. Trying to have a party install a malicious image under the attackers control.
+2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image.  For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.
+3. Making images unavailable for installation.


For Notary, we could phrase this "Disrupt the verification of image signatures."

~~images~~ - artifacts

sudo-bmitch · 2021-04-10T01:21:22Z

threatmodel.md

+2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image.  For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.
+3. Making images unavailable for installation.
+4. Preventing a party from learning about updates to currently installed images.
+5. Convincing a party to download large amounts of data that interfere with the party's system.


To scope this to Notary, we could say something like "Inject a malicious (oversized) signature that disrupts verification" (my phrasing could use improvement). The manifest itself will have a size limit imposed by many runtimes (like containerd), see this OCI issue for more context. The manifest includes descriptors that provide both the digest and size of the blob, so if the manifest digest is signed and verified, the only gap for us to cover is the signature artifact itself.

We had a good discussion about size attacks, and I thought we decided to scope this out of Notary. Registries already have mechanisms to cope with DOS attacks, and the descriptor already has enough info for artifact clients to gate these.
Suggest we remove # 5.

mnm678

Thanks for the suggestions @sudo-bmitch. I can't edit this directly, but I left some new wording for @JustinCappos to review, or I can re-open this pr from my fork.

threatmodel.md

mnm678 · 2021-04-12T17:40:01Z

threatmodel.md

@@ -10,3 +10,10 @@ It is assumed that an attacker may perform one or more the following actions:

 While it is not always possible to protect against all scenarios, the system should to the extent possible mitigate and/or reduce the damage caused by a successful attack, detect the occurrence of an attack and notify appropriate parties, yet remain usable for parties operating the system.  Furthermore, the system should recover from successful attacks in a way that presents low operational overhead and risk to users.

+Attacker Goals:
+1. Trying to have a party install a malicious image under the attackers control.
+2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image.  For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.


Suggested change

2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image. For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.

2. To have a party deploy an artifact using a digest or tag that does not have a currently valid signature. For example, a previous version of an artifact with a signature that was revoked by the signer, or an old version associated with a tag.

This changes the meaning a bit. The prior also would include artifacts that were not the latest (when the latest is requested), but this seems to imply those are fine.

I updated my change. In some cases, someone might pull an old image by digest on purpose, and as long as the signature is still valid, this should be accepted, which is the subtlety I was trying to add. But yes, it still needs to use the latest tag mapping when tags are used.

mnm678 · 2021-04-12T17:40:09Z

threatmodel.md

+Attacker Goals:
+1. Trying to have a party install a malicious image under the attackers control.
+2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image.  For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.
+3. Making images unavailable for installation.


Suggested change

3. Making images unavailable for installation.

3. Disrupt the verification of artifact signatures, for example by making the current version of metadata unavailable.

~~image~~ - artifact

This is a bit more specific. I don't know if it matters, but it reads like your text is a special case of mine...

I was trying to make it clear that DoS attacks are out of scope, but there might be a better way to word this.

threatmodel.md

Co-authored-by: Marina Moore <[email protected]>

mnm678 · 2021-06-11T15:38:35Z

threatmodel.md

+2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image.  For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.
+3. Making images unavailable for installation.
+4. Prevent a party from learning about updates to currently installed artifacts.
+5. Convince a party to download large amounts of data, such as signatures or metadata, that interfere with the party's system.


This is covered by the size already listed in the registry, so is probably out of scope for Notary

mnm678 · 2021-08-03T17:49:19Z

superceded by #76

JustinCappos and others added 2 commits May 1, 2020 12:45

Added attacker goals

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Signed-off-by: Justin Cappos <[email protected]>

Update threatmodel.md

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Co-authored-by: Marina Moore <[email protected]>

SteveLasker reviewed Apr 9, 2021

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sudo-bmitch suggested changes Apr 10, 2021

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sudo-bmitch mentioned this pull request Apr 10, 2021

Attack scenarios #33

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mnm678 commented Apr 12, 2021

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JustinCappos and others added 4 commits April 13, 2021 14:27

Update threatmodel.md

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Co-authored-by: Marina Moore <[email protected]>

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Co-authored-by: Marina Moore <[email protected]>

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mnm678 mentioned this pull request May 27, 2021

Add a document describing key revocation #47

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mnm678 commented Jun 11, 2021

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mnm678 mentioned this pull request Jun 21, 2021

Attacker goals #76

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Attacker goals #35

Attacker goals #35

mnm678 commented Aug 27, 2020

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mnm678 commented Aug 3, 2021

	2. Trying to have a party install an outdated image. For example, one with known security vulnerabilities.
	2. To have a party deploy an artifact using a digest or tag that does not have a currently valid signature. For example, a previous version of an artifact with a signature that was revoked by the signer, or an old version associated with a tag.

	3. Making images unavailable for installation.
	3. Disrupt the verification of artifact signatures, for example by making the current version of metadata unavailable.

Attacker goals #35

Attacker goals #35

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mnm678 commented Aug 27, 2020

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mnm678 commented Aug 3, 2021

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