We go above and beyond what most projects would consider "good enough" to make it very difficult for anyone to compromise our work and hope that we can demonstrate the implementation of many security best practices.

If you find a security vulnerability that we've missed, do not open an issue, but contact us privately instead.

Drupal as a project has a very proactive security team that publishes security advisories and co-ordinates fixes every week.

On the production (live) site, all user roles that have access to any adminstration areas have permissions limited to the minimum required to edit site content and administer user accounts; if one of these accounts is compromised, this limits the damage someone can do.

No role is granted the ability to change permissions. Any changes to permissions are made in local dev environments and pushed to the site as configuration, which the site automatically imports as part of the deployment process.

Additionally, no user role is marked as an administrator to prevent accidentally granting new permissions automatically when installing a new Drupal module.

User roles that have access to any administration areas have two factor authentication as an enforced requirement so even if a password is compromised, it alone can't be used to log in.

The administrator user created by Drupal core with a user ID of 1 - which always has unconditional full access to every possible administration page or configuration - is blocked in every environment; additionally, we have mechanisms in place that prevent unblocking of that account.

Various modules that provide a user interface to alter how content is output are uninstalled in production, including the Drupal core Field UI and Views UI modules. Any changes that need to be made to content output are made in local dev environments, exported as configuration, and pushed to the production site which automatically imports any updated configuration during the deployment process.

As part of our deployment process, before Drupal is able to accept requests, we remove all write permissions from everything in the publicly accessible web directory, except for directories necessary for Drupal to function, such as the aggregated assets directory. This means that once deployed, Drupal cannot modify its codebase.

Directories that Drupal can write to have PHP execution disabled so in the unlikely case someone were to find a way to upload a PHP file to one of these directories, the web server would refuse to run it.

We implement a fairly restrictive Content-Security-Policy header via the Drupal module of the same name, so that in the unlikely event someone finds a way to inject malicious code into our database that gets sent to our users, their browsers will refuse to run most or all of it. See our MDN HTTP Observatory scan results.

We have fairly restrictive session cookies to make it very difficult for them to be leaked and used by anyone other than the user they're intended for.