Lint Markdown files & Setup Navigation

app/local/config/navigation/protocol.ts

@@ -409,6 +409,26 @@ export const navigation: SectionData[] = [
             {
                 title: '📖 Proposals Term 5',
                 links: [
+                    {
+                        // eslint-disable-next-line prettier/prettier
+                        title: '5.8 - [Social] ENS Steward Vesting Proposal',
+                        href: '/dao/proposals/5.8',
+                    },
+                    {
+                        // eslint-disable-next-line prettier/prettier
+                        title: '5.7 - [Social] Security Council',
+                        href: '/dao/proposals/5.7',
+                    },
+                    {
+                        // eslint-disable-next-line prettier/prettier
+                        title: '5.6 - [Executable] Enable Self-Funding for the Endowment',
+                        href: '/dao/proposals/5.6',
+                    },
+                    {
+                        // eslint-disable-next-line prettier/prettier
+                        title: '5.5 - [Executable] Funding Request: ENS Public Goods Working Group Term 5 (Q1/Q2)',
+                        href: '/dao/proposals/5.5',
+                    },
                     {
                         // eslint-disable-next-line prettier/prettier
                         title: '5.4.2 - [Social] Funding Request: ENS Meta-Governance Working Group Term 5 (Q1/Q2)',

docs/dao/proposals/5.4.2.mdx

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The Public Goods working group funds projects and builders improving the Web3 ec
 
 This social proposal is submitted to satisfy the requirements set out in Rule 10.1.1 of the Working Group Rules ([EP 1.8](https://docs.ens.domains/v/governance/governance-proposals/term-1/ep12-working-group-rules)) and further required by [this snapshot proposal in Nov. 2023 modifying steward rules.](https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0x26a5c8dec547837495707e70446d1e7cd874a91f75753c602998f6e70083a266) If this proposal is passed, the funding request will be included in a collective executable proposal put forward by all three Working Groups.
 
-# Specification
+## Specification
 
 The current balance of the Public Goods multisig contains 147.2k USDC and 33.5 ETH.
 The working group requests an additional 450.3k USDC and 21.5 ETH from the DAO to accommodate this proposed budget.
@@ -49,20 +49,20 @@ The working group requests an additional 450.3k USDC and 21.5 ETH from the DAO t
 
 *Mult-sig contains 200 ENS that has no planned use. This may be transferred back to the DAO wallet during the term.
 
-# Description of Initiatives
+## Description of Initiatives
 
-## [](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#large-grants-3)Large Grants
+### [Large Grants](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#large-grants-3)
 
 Grants up to 50k USDC with applications accepted on a rolling basis throughout the year-long term. Large Grants will resume in Q2. With five grantees completing milestones from last term, the budget includes remaining payouts yet to be 
 disbursed. We plan to add at least two more grantees during Q2 while piloting new grants management software. In the second half of the year, we will run another full-size round supporting up to 10 grantees at a time with a 200k USD total prize 
 pool. 
 
-## [](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#small-grants-4)Small Grants
+### [Small Grants](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#small-grants-4)
 
 Multiple micro-grantsvoted on by the community. Small Grants will resume during the first half of the year shortly after ETHDenver. We have added the amount expected to spend through the end of the year with no increase from last term. This is 
 approximately 12.5 ETH per quarter. With market fluctuations, stewards may right-size and lower the amounts distributed during round
 
-## [](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#events-and-hackathons-5)Events and Hackathons
+### [Events and Hackathons](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#events-and-hackathons-5)
 
 The working group will support Public Goods events and hackathons. Funds have included expenses related to the funding of hackathons, events, and related participation in events (judging, panels, speaking) where necessary.
 
@@ -82,6 +82,6 @@ The current earmarked events are:
 This list is not guaranteed as several events are still in the planning stages.
 The PG stewards will continuously assess opportunities to expand the public goods conversation and collaborations.
 
-## [](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#discretionary-6)Discretionary
+### [Discretionary](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/public-goods-group-budget-h1-2024/18725#discretionary-6)
 
 The funds in this initiative are reserved for additional grant opportunities and expenses that arise during the term. Spending on this initiative is at the discretion of the working group stewards.

docs/dao/proposals/5.5.mdx

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ export const meta = {
     description: 'This specification is the amount requested from the DAO treasury to the Public Goods Multisig to fulfill anticipated budgetary needs through September 2024.',
     emoji: '📖',
     contributors: [
-        'Coltron.eth, Vegayp.eth, Simona.eth'
+        'coltron.eth',
+        'vegayp.eth',
+        'simona.eth'
     ],
     proposal: {
         tally: '48839151689001950442481252711111182244814765601408465024742109276815020082612',

docs/dao/proposals/5.6.mdx

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ export const meta = {
     description: 'This EP authorises metagov to withdraw 30 ETH from the endowment each month for fees, and reimburses metagov for 43.54 ETH in fees already incurred.',
     emoji: '📖',
     contributors: [
-        'Nick.eth'
+        'nick.eth'
     ],
     proposal: {
         tally: '45720656345448826187222659689199787286494046921153399380076959662321080408931',
@@ -55,3 +55,4 @@ Target:
 
 Value:
 0
+```

docs/dao/proposals/5.7.mdx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {/** @type {import('@/lib/mdxPageProps').MdxMetaProps} */}
 export const meta = {
-    description: 'This EP aims to safeguard the DAO by establishing a Security Council with a two-year, time-limited veto power to counter malicious proposals, ensuring the protocol's integrity and promoting decentralized governance.',
+    description: 'This EP aims to safeguard the DAO by establishing a Security Council with a two-year, time-limited veto power to counter malicious proposals, ensuring the protocol\'s integrity and promoting decentralized governance.',
     emoji: '📖',
     contributors: [
         'alextnetto.eth'
@@ -11,32 +11,36 @@ export const meta = {
     }
 };
 
-# [EP5.7][Social] Security Council
+# [EP5.7] [Social] Security Council
 
 ## Abstract
+
 The primary mission of ENS DAO is to govern the protocol and allocate resources from the treasury in line with the DAO's constitution and broader objectives. However, due to changing economic dynamics, the DAO is increasingly vulnerable to attacks aimed at draining its treasury.
 
 To safeguard the DAO's integrity and longevity, a Security Council with the authority to cancel malicious proposals is needed. To avoid perpetuating centralized power, the Security Council's authority will have a built-in expiration date. After two years, anyone will be able to call a function that revokes the council's power to veto proposals, ensuring a time-limited mechanism to counter malicious attacks while promoting more delegation and governance distribution.
 
 ## Motivation
+
 As ENS continues to grow, its treasury in ETH is always growing. Simultaneously, the percentage of tokens actively delegated is on the decline.  
 
-![Dune.png](ipfs://bafkreifqrdrm5t3qzlbbsssdlebild2azbfovyjixwa5cedlg5f3ijsxuu)
+![Dune.png](https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreifqrdrm5t3qzlbbsssdlebild2azbfovyjixwa5cedlg5f3ijsxuu)
 
 This imbalance creates a risk where an attacker could acquire enough $ENS to gain control of the DAO at a cost lower than the treasury's total value. This has been a growing concern since March 2023. 
 
-![image](ipfs://bafkreicuwrazcaaxvn6ywavjzc2ozutbmnbt5q2pd2lfakb6d7iszfq4q4)
+![image](https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreicuwrazcaaxvn6ywavjzc2ozutbmnbt5q2pd2lfakb6d7iszfq4q4)
 
 Past attacks on DAOs have exploited similar vulnerabilities, with some [being thwarted](https://twitter.com/AragonProject/status/1656028382939815937) by components with veto power. Currently, the ENS governance process involves a proposal passing through the governor, relying on delegated voting power for approval. If approved, the governor queues the proposal in a timelock contract, delaying execution by two days. While the governor can cancel proposals, it follows the same pathway as a malicious proposal, introducing potential risks.
 
 The short-term solution was delegating 3.8M $ENS to a contract that can only vote "Against"; more details about this can be found in [Nick's forum post](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/introducing-veto-ensdao-eth/19088). The attack is still profitable and, depending on market conditions can be up to a 3x ROI, like in Dec 2023. We need a mid-term solution to cancel the attack, which is this proposal. An article about this research done by the Blockful team will be published [here](https://blockful.io/blog/ens-security-council-snapshot) after the proposal is executed and there is no attack risk.
 
 ## Specification
+
 To enhance security, a veto contract will be deployed. Controlled by a Security Council multisig and will have the PROPOSER_ROLE in the timelock, granting it the ability to cancel proposals without the power to initiate or modify other DAO actions. The scope of this proposal is to assign the PROPOSER_ROLE to the veto contract,
 
 To ensure decentralization, the contract will also feature a time-based expiration mechanism that allows anyone to revoke the PROPOSER_ROLE after two years. This window provides time to strengthen delegation and address current vulnerabilities, facilitating the DAO's transition to a more secure governance model.
 
 ## Security considerations
+
 Assigning the PROPOSER_ROLE to a multisig within the timelock contract is overly broad for our requirements as it allows the address to add proposals directly to the queue. If the multisig signers are compromised, they could potentially propose and execute malicious changes. Therefore our approach would be to deploy a new contract similar to the current veto.ensdao.eth contract, which can only do one action: to CANCEL a transaction in the timelock. That would be a trivially simple contract and it would be hard locked to only accept calls from a newly created SAFE multisig.
 
 The risk is mitigated but one scenario remains: if the whole multisig is compromised then a malicious entity could kick other signers and effectively stop the DAO from executing proposals by canceling all transactions, including any that would remove this contract from the proposal role. Anyways, after 2 years, anyone can remove the proposal role.
@@ -49,6 +53,7 @@ With that in light. the following considerations are essential for ensuring the
 Finding the right balance for the multisig threshold is crucial. A higher threshold can complicate coordination but reduces the risk of malicious activity. A lower threshold, while more agile, could make the DAO more susceptible to attacks or unintended consequences if a few signers are compromised. The suggested composition is a 4/8 multisig.
 
 ## Council Operations
+
 It is in the best interest of everyone to make clear the expectations and responsibilities ENS DAO put on those members, backed by the reputation, other roles and gains those might have in the organization. 
 
 The security council is expected to act only in emergency, in the given following situations or similar cases:
@@ -63,4 +68,4 @@ Those definitions are not exhaustive, and the trust deposited in the elected mem
 - take quick action on behalf of the DAO
 - comprehend the proposals being approved and their repercussions
 
-The Security Council members will be the same signers for the veto.ensdao.eth, their identities are known, have signed a pledged to uphold the ENS constitution and live in countries with a solid legal system.
+The Security Council members will be the same signers for the veto.ensdao.eth, their identities are known, have signed a pledged to uphold the ENS constitution and live in countries with a solid legal system.

docs/dao/proposals/5.8.mdx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {/** @type {import('@/lib/mdxPageProps').MdxMetaProps} */}
 export const meta = {
-    description: 'This EP aims to safeguard the DAO by establishing a Security Council with a two-year, time-limited veto power to counter malicious proposals, ensuring the protocol's integrity and promoting decentralized governance.',
+    description: 'This EP aims to safeguard the DAO by establishing a Security Council with a two-year, time-limited veto power to counter malicious proposals, ensuring the protocol\'s integrity and promoting decentralized governance.',
     emoji: '📖',
     contributors: [
         'fireeyesdao.eth'
@@ -11,27 +11,30 @@ export const meta = {
     }
 };
 
-# [5.8][Social] ENS Steward Vesting Proposal
+# [5.8] [Social] ENS Steward Vesting Proposal
 
 ## Abstract
+
 Following discussion in the Metagov funding request thread and feedback on the Temp Check Proposal, we have put together this amendment proposal which looks to add the requirement of vesting to ENS distributions to stewards for the current term.
 
 Under the current proposal, the MetaGov Working Group will be distributed liquid ENS tokens which will then be distributed individually to stewards. As discussed on the forum and on Meta-Gov calls, these tokens should be vested in order to ensure long-term alignment of stewards with the DAO, whilst ensuring that they are able to use the tokens to particiapte in governance.
 
 This proposal is only in reference to adding vesting to current term steward allocations. With more discussion and input needed for any other changes to steward compensation going forward.
 
 ## Specification
+
 All ENS disbursements to stewards will be vested on a linear 24 month schedule from the time of their appointment. In line with the 12 month term that each steward serves plus an additional 12 months of vesting to encourage longterm DAO alignment.
 
 This vesting will be implemented by using Hedgey which allows stewards to access the full voting power of their allocated tokens up front, whilst ensuring that the monetary value of these tokens can only be accessed based on the vesting schedule.
 
 All ENS marked for steward compensation will be transferred via executable proposal to the metagov WG multisig. Term 5 stewards were appointed at the beginning of Q1 2024, and as such are already 4 and a half months into their term.
 
-For the current term’s stewards, ENS vesting will be scaled retroactively based on the time since their appointment. ~37.5% of ENS will be distributed to stewards directly from the multisig, whilst the remaining ENS will then be deposited into each steward’s vesting contract. These contracts will be set up by Hedgey.
+For the current term's stewards, ENS vesting will be scaled retroactively based on the time since their appointment. ~37.5% of ENS will be distributed to stewards directly from the multisig, whilst the remaining ENS will then be deposited into each steward's vesting contract. These contracts will be set up by Hedgey.
 
 ## Vote
+
 * For - Apply vesting to the current term
 * Against - Do not apply vesting to the current term in line with the 2023/2024 guidance
 * Abstain
 
-This vote adjusts the structure of ENS token distributions to stewards, and if passed, the Meta-gov working group will implement this vesting schedule (and associated tooling) for all ENS token distributions to stewards.
+This vote adjusts the structure of ENS token distributions to stewards, and if passed, the Meta-gov working group will implement this vesting schedule (and associated tooling) for all ENS token distributions to stewards.