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This repository has been archived by the owner on Oct 18, 2024. It is now read-only.
correctly, it tries to append the user provided CAs to the system certificates. I think this is wrong - if user passes own CA certificates, it should be used exclusively and not mixed with some system certificates.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
What's the reason you think it's wrong? Do you see any drawback? At the beginning we thought this way then discussing with @k-wall we thought that there is no good reason for adding and not exclusive CA provided cert. Open to listen your reasons.
It is IMO wrong because you trust way more CAs then the user requested, so IMHO it is a security issue. If the user tells the canary to trust a specific CA, it should not trust his CA and many other CAs. You can use that for example to trick the canary to connect to a different server with completely different CA for example. If this was not under development but released I would say it is a CVE.
If nothing else, there should be an option to not do this. But at least personally, I also haven't seen any other application do this - so it would be also unexpected for the users at least in the Kafka land. So I think it should not do this at all.
Also - leaving the appending aside - even the use of the system certs by default contradicts the documentation in the README.md which says that the default is empty which is not true if it defaults to the system certs. I think this part is fine and useful and mirrors for example the Java behaviour, but should be covered correctly in the docs.
If I read the code in
strimzi-canary/internal/security/security.go
Line 33 in 3e21f06
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: