-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 229
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
TODO: Need mitigation description for "Use a compromised build tool" threat #1184
Comments
I think a reasonable mitigation here is something like "Treat build tooling, including OS images, as any other software to be verified prior to use (as described in (G)). This will allow the build platform to detect any modified binaries." Once the attested build environments track is finalized we can update this mitigation to reference it specifically. CC @marcelamelara Separately, I'm wondering if this is a reason to move the mitigations from (G) (discussed in #1190, #1191) to (I) since 'usage' is more clearly aligned with this risk than with 'distribution channel'. (Or maybe we can just tweak the mitigation language here to discuss). |
@TomHennen Definitely happy to help with this as well! |
This threat can be mitigated in a number of ways, here I address it in the simplest one, verifying the tooling prior to use. You can also imagine resolving it by recording the digests in the provenance, and propagating VSAs so that downstream verifiers can verify recursively, but that's pretty complicated. You can also resolve this with the attested build environments track, but I don't think we should mention that here until it's finalized? Or maybe we can point to it now as 'coming soon'? fixes slsa-framework#1184 Signed-off-by: Tom Hennen <[email protected]>
This threat can be mitigated in a number of ways, here I address it in the simplest one, verifying the tooling prior to use. You can also imagine resolving it by recording the digests in the provenance, and propagating VSAs so that downstream verifiers can verify recursively, but that's pretty complicated. You can also resolve this with the attested build environments track, but I don't think we should mention that here until it's finalized? Or maybe we can point to it now as 'coming soon'? fixes #1184 --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Hennen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Hennen <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Marcela Melara <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Trishank Karthik Kuppusamy <[email protected]>
No description provided.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: