From e4322e54fbbf697098496541bd63132826be2854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: ID Bot <idbot@example.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 07:57:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Script updating gh-pages from 2918a38. [ci skip]

---
 seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.html | 2 +-
 seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.txt  | 3 +--
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.html b/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.html
index f7c79df..5c8493b 100644
--- a/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.html
+++ b/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.html
@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
 However, in both CTT and TTC mode, a denial of service can occur if the attacker can adjust the relying party's clock so that the CMS validation fails.
 This could disrupt the timestamp validation.<a href="#section-5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 <p id="section-5-4">In CTT mode, an attacker could manipulate the unprotected header by removing or replacing the timestamp.
-To avoid that, the signed COSE object should be securely wrapped in an envelope during transit and at rest.<a href="#section-5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
+To avoid that, the signed COSE object should be integrity protected during transit and at rest.<a href="#section-5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 <p id="section-5-5">In TTC mode, the TSA is given an opaque identifier (a cryptographic hash value) for the payload.
 While this means that the content of the payload is not directly revealed, to prevent comparison with known payloads or disclosure of identical payloads being used over time, the payload would need to be armored, e.g., with a nonce that is shared with the recipient of the header parameter but not the TSA.
 Such a mechanism can be employed inside the ones described in this specification, but is out of scope for this document.<a href="#section-5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
diff --git a/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.txt b/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.txt
index eed6cad..54ba145 100644
--- a/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.txt
+++ b/seccons++/draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter.txt
@@ -241,8 +241,7 @@ Table of Contents
 
    In CTT mode, an attacker could manipulate the unprotected header by
    removing or replacing the timestamp.  To avoid that, the signed COSE
-   object should be securely wrapped in an envelope during transit and
-   at rest.
+   object should be integrity protected during transit and at rest.
 
    In TTC mode, the TSA is given an opaque identifier (a cryptographic
    hash value) for the payload.  While this means that the content of