README.md

Race Condition

There is a gap between the creation of a transaction and the moment it is accepted in the blockchain. Therefore, an attacker can take advantage of this gap to put a contract in a state that advantages them.

Attack Scenario

• Bob creates RaceCondition(100, token). Alice trusts RaceCondition with all its tokens. Alice calls buy(150) Bob sees the transaction, and calls changePrice(300). The transaction of Bob is mined before the one of Alice and as a result, Bob received 300 tokens.

• The ERC20 standard's approve and transferFrom functions are vulnerable to a race condition. Suppose Alice has approved Bob to spend 100 tokens on her behalf. She then decides to only approve him for 50 tokens and sends a second approve transaction. However, Bob sees that he's about to be downgraded and quickly submits a transferFrom for the original 100 tokens he was approved for. If this transaction gets mined before Alice's second approve, Bob will be able to spend 150 of Alice's tokens.

Mitigations

• For the ERC20 bug, insist that Alice only be able to approve Bob when he is approved for 0 tokens.
• Keep in mind that all transactions may be front-run

Examples

• Race condition outlined in the first bullet point above