diff --git a/manuscript/ngos-authoritarianism.md b/manuscript/ngos-authoritarianism.md
index 0e38839..720946c 100644
--- a/manuscript/ngos-authoritarianism.md
+++ b/manuscript/ngos-authoritarianism.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ author:
 - name: Andrew Heiss
   affiliation: Brigham Young University
   email: andrew_heiss@byu.edu
-date: May 31, 2018
+date: June 15, 2018
 published: "Forthcoming in the *Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations*"
 reference-section-title: References
 mainfont: Cardo
@@ -17,16 +17,16 @@ China's anti-NGO law is part of a larger global trend of closing civic space in
 
 Despite this increasingly closed space for global civil society, international NGO continue to operate in authoritarian regimes, even in counties that have become more hostile. As of May 1, 2018, over one thousand foreign NGOs have gained either permanent or temporary official legal status in China under the provisions of the 2017 Overseas NGO law, including ten that work on labor issues and many others that deal with other potentially contentious issues [@Batke:2018]. More curiously, since the 1990s, China has strategically invited dozens of Western NGOs to set up offices locally, specifically to provide policy guidance and technical governing expertise [@Wheeler:2013]. Greenpeace—one of the most radical and outspoken INGOs in environmental advocacy—has offices in Beijing and has helped draft laws related to renewable energy and other environmental issues [@Teets:2014]. Though the 2017 law emphasizes the national security risks of foreign NGOs, consulting with INGOs is a regular policy practice for the Chinese government. Despite their public pronouncements that NGOs are threats, authoritarian regimes around the world allow them and rely on them.
 
-This presents a perplexing phenomenon. Authoritarian restrictions on domestic and international civil society have increased over the past decade, but authoritarian states continue to allow—and even invite—NGOs to work in their countries. Though the services and advocacy provided by NGOs can challenge the legitimacy and power of authoritarian regimes, the majority of autocratic states allow NGO activities, and NGOs in turn continue to work in these countries in spite of the heavy legal restrictions and attempts to limit their activities. This chapter examines the theories about and the experiences of domestic and international NGOs working in authoritarian countries. The review is premised on the theory of authoritarian institutions: dictators delegate political authority to democratic-appearing institutions in order to remain in power and maintain stability. After providing a brief overview of authoritarian institutionalism and balancing, I discuss how domestic and international NGOs fit into authoritarian stability-seeking calculus. I then look at three forms of state–NGO relationships in the context of authoritarianism and explore how autocrats have addressed and regulated international NGOs in particular. Finally, I conclude with suggestions for future research on NGOs and their relationship with and role in authoritarian regimes.
+This presents a perplexing phenomenon. Authoritarian restrictions on domestic and international civil society have increased over the past decade, but authoritarian states continue to allow—and even invite—NGOs to work in their countries. Though the services and advocacy provided by NGOs can challenge the legitimacy and power of authoritarian regimes, the majority of autocratic states allow NGO activities, and NGOs in turn continue to work in these countries in spite of the heavy legal restrictions and attempts to limit their activities. This chapter examines the theories about and the experiences of domestic and international NGOs working in authoritarian countries. Each of the countries discussed in this chapter have been classified as autocracies by @GeddesWrightFrantz:2014 at some point since 1990. Some cases have democratized between 1990 and 2018, but the relationship between state and civil society is still shaped by the country's authoritarian legacy. The review is premised on the theory of authoritarian institutions: dictators delegate political authority to democratic-appearing institutions in order to remain in power and maintain stability. After providing a brief overview of authoritarian institutionalism and balancing, I discuss how domestic and international NGOs fit into authoritarian stability-seeking calculus. I then look at three forms of state–NGO relationships in the context of authoritarianism and explore how autocrats have addressed and regulated international NGOs in particular. Finally, I conclude with suggestions for future research on NGOs and their relationship with and role in authoritarian regimes.
 
 
 # Authoritarian institutions
 
 Despite the popular image of all-powerful dictators who exert total control over their countries, authoritarians are often precariously positioned and run the risk of regime collapse or overthrow. A growing literature in comparative politics argues that authoritarianism is a dynamic form of governance, with rulers engaging in constant legislative, constitutional, and institutional reforms as part of a complex multi-level game played by the regime, elites, opposition forces, international actors, activists, and social movements [@Stacher:2012, 31]. Autocrats must carefully balance external actors and institutions to remain in power [@LevitskyWay:2010], and failure to do so can lead to regime collapse [@Heiss:2012; @Svolik:2009]. Ultimately, the persistence or collapse of authoritarian regimes depends on the quality and management of their institutional restraints and rivals [@Brownlee:2007, 202], and if "rulers counter [threats to their rule] with an adequate degree of institutionalization, they survive in power" [@GandhiPrzeworski:2007, 284]. 
 
-Political institutions lie at the core of modern authoritarianism and autocracy. As such, throughout this chapter, I use an institutional definition of authoritarianism. Autocracy is not the opposite of democracy—autocracy occurs when an executive achieves power through undemocratic means, when a democratically elected government changes the formal or informal institutions to limit competition in the future, or when militaries prevent electoral competition [@GeddesWrightFrantz:2014].[^1] An autocrat interested in maintaining power over their population without turning to absolute totalitarianism can either outlaw opposition to their policies through political repression, or improve the popularity of their policies by manufacturing political loyalty and creating a veneer of popular consent [@Wintrobe:1990; @Gandhi:2006], and autocrats carry out both strategies by navigating and manipulating the institutional landscape in their states. However, interacting with external institutions is often fraught with risks. Though coercive institutions like the military and secret police forces are instrumental for maintaining state authority, finding the right balance of repression is difficult. Civilian authoritarian regimes often rely on strong militaries for legitimacy and coercion, but as regimes face economic hardship, popular unrest, or political instability, those militaries can emerge from their barracks to overthrow the failing state and instate new civilian authorities [@Cook:2007], as most recently seen in the military's interventions against both Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi in post-2011 Egypt. Internal police forces, deputized by autocrats to prevent coups against their regimes, pose a similar dilemma: secret police agencies that are too powerful could potentially stage their own coup against the autocrat, but forces that are too weak—and thus unable to revolt—are also unable to exercise coercive authority over the population and are thus ineffective at preventing popular coups [@Greitens:2016]. Striking the right balance of coercion is difficult and failure to do so can lead to regime collapse.
+Political institutions lie at the core of modern authoritarianism and autocracy. As such, throughout this chapter, I use an institutional definition of authoritarianism. Autocracy is not the opposite of democracy—autocracy occurs when an executive achieves power through undemocratic means, when a democratically elected government changes the formal or informal institutions to limit competition in the future, or when militaries prevent electoral competition [@GeddesWrightFrantz:2014]. An autocrat interested in maintaining power over their population without turning to absolute totalitarianism can either outlaw opposition to their policies through political repression, or improve the popularity of their policies by manufacturing political loyalty and creating a veneer of popular consent [@Wintrobe:1990; @Gandhi:2006], and autocrats carry out both strategies by navigating and manipulating the institutional landscape in their states. However, interacting with external institutions is often fraught with risks. Though coercive institutions like the military and secret police forces are instrumental for maintaining state authority, finding the right balance of repression is difficult. Civilian authoritarian regimes often rely on strong militaries for legitimacy and coercion, but as regimes face economic hardship, popular unrest, or political instability, those militaries can emerge from their barracks to overthrow the failing state and instate new civilian authorities [@Cook:2007], as most recently seen in the military's interventions against both Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi in post-2011 Egypt. Internal police forces, deputized by autocrats to prevent coups against their regimes, pose a similar dilemma: secret police agencies that are too powerful could potentially stage their own coup against the autocrat, but forces that are too weak—and thus unable to revolt—are also unable to exercise coercive authority over the population and are thus ineffective at preventing popular coups [@Greitens:2016]. Striking the right balance of coercion is difficult and failure to do so can lead to regime collapse.
 
-Because it is infeasible to rely solely on violent oppression to maintain power, autocrats have increasingly allowed for a degree of institutional dissonance and competition to manufacture popular consent and loyalty [@Brumberg:2002]. Today, dictatorships don "democratic garb" [@Brownlee:2007, 25] and mimic democratic institutions to ensure their survival, offset domestic pressure, and boost their international reputation [@Kendall-TaylorFrantz:2014a; @GandhiPrzeworski:2007]. As seen in @fig:dictator-institutions, most authoritarian regimes hold competitive elections [@LevitskyWay:2010] and allow for multiparty legislatures [@Blaydes:2011], and many have empowered an independent judiciary [@GinsburgMoustafa:2008] and use independent central banks to set monetary policy [@Boylan:2001].[^2] While these reforms—many of which are hallmarks of democratization—appear momentous to outsiders, these democratic-appearing institutions are designed to increase regime stability and longevity. For example, Egypt has held competitive parliamentary elections for decades, but not with the purpose of giving citizens representation in government. Instead, regimes have used elections to dole out patronage to politicians who proved their loyalty through competitive elections, thus mediating (or prolonging) distributional conflict between lower elites who could theoretically oppose the regime [@Blaydes:2011]. Dictators create pseudo-democratic institutions to control the severity of the threat that elites pose to authoritarian stability. Parties, judiciaries, elections, and reforms are allowed, but they are kept weak and "dependent on the regime to ensure that they do not develop any real power or autonomy" [@FrantzEzrow:2011, 7].
+Because it is infeasible to rely solely on violent oppression to maintain power, autocrats have increasingly allowed for a degree of institutional dissonance and competition to manufacture popular consent and loyalty [@Brumberg:2002]. Today, dictatorships don "democratic garb" [@Brownlee:2007, 25] and mimic democratic institutions to ensure their survival, offset domestic pressure, and boost their international reputation [@Kendall-TaylorFrantz:2014a; @GandhiPrzeworski:2007]. As seen in @fig:dictator-institutions, most authoritarian regimes hold competitive elections [@LevitskyWay:2010] and allow for multiparty legislatures [@Blaydes:2011], and many have empowered an independent judiciary [@GinsburgMoustafa:2008] and use independent central banks to set monetary policy [@Boylan:2001].[^1] While these reforms—many of which are hallmarks of democratization—appear momentous to outsiders, these democratic-appearing institutions are designed to increase regime stability and longevity. For example, Egypt has held competitive parliamentary elections for decades, but not with the purpose of giving citizens representation in government. Instead, regimes have used elections to dole out patronage to politicians who proved their loyalty through competitive elections, thus mediating (or prolonging) distributional conflict between lower elites who could theoretically oppose the regime [@Blaydes:2011]. Dictators create pseudo-democratic institutions to control the severity of the threat that elites pose to authoritarian stability. Parties, judiciaries, elections, and reforms are allowed, but they are kept weak and "dependent on the regime to ensure that they do not develop any real power or autonomy" [@FrantzEzrow:2011, 7].
 
 ![Adoption of pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian states since 1970](output/fig\_dictator\_institutions){#fig:dictator-institutions}
 
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ To offset the risks and reap the rewards of allowing NGOs in their countries, di
 
 ![Civil society repression and regulations](output/fig\_repression\_regulation){#fig:repression-regulation}
 
-Restrictions on NGOs have increased in both autocracies and democracies since the 1990s, but in different ways. Panel A in @fig:repression-regulation shows the prevalence and severity of NGO registration laws in 98 countries from 1990–2013.[^3] Both types of regimes require NGO registration—nearly three-fourths of autocracies have had formal registration requirements for decades, while democracies began increasing registration requirements in the early 2000s. Stricter registration requirements do not necessarily make life more difficult for NGOs, though, and this increase in NGO laws in democracies is likely attributable to the routinization of NGO–government relations [@ChaudhryHeiss:2017]. This is apparent in Panel A: NGO registration has become substantially more burdensome in autocracies than in democracies. Autocrats have passed dozens of restrictive laws aimed at limiting the scope of foreign-connected NGOs and incorporating domestic NGOs into the state. Panel B highlights the contrast of the severity of NGO regulations across regime types. The overwhelming majority of democracies impose almost no restrictions on civil society organizations working in their countries. Autocracies, on the other hand, are much more heterogenous in their treatment of NGOs, with most imposing moderate restrictions. 
+Restrictions on NGOs have increased in both autocracies and democracies since the 1990s, but in different ways. Panel A in @fig:repression-regulation shows the prevalence and severity of NGO registration laws in 98 countries from 1990–2013.[^2] Both types of regimes require NGO registration—nearly three-fourths of autocracies have had formal registration requirements for decades, while democracies began increasing registration requirements in the early 2000s. Stricter registration requirements do not necessarily make life more difficult for NGOs, though, and this increase in NGO laws in democracies is likely attributable to the routinization of NGO–government relations [@ChaudhryHeiss:2017]. This is apparent in Panel A: NGO registration has become substantially more burdensome in autocracies than in democracies. Autocrats have passed dozens of restrictive laws aimed at limiting the scope of foreign-connected NGOs and incorporating domestic NGOs into the state. Panel B highlights the contrast of the severity of NGO regulations across regime types. The overwhelming majority of democracies impose almost no restrictions on civil society organizations working in their countries. Autocracies, on the other hand, are much more heterogenous in their treatment of NGOs, with most imposing moderate restrictions. 
 
 Most authoritarian legal restrictions on civil society today target the funding of domestic and international NGOs from international aid agencies and foundations. Autocrats have turned to anti-NGO legislation—and foreign funding laws in particular—for multiple reasons, including increased nationalism and xenophobia, counterterrorism policies, and a "wider questioning of Western power" [@Carothers:2015, 9; see also @CarothersBrechenmacher:2014]. Fears of foreign influence in domestic politics underlie all these factors, and the decision to limit the space for NGO funding and advocacy is tied directly to concerns of regime stability and institutional balance. For instance, @DupuyRonPrakash:2016 find that autocrats are more likely to adopt laws that restrict foreign funding to NGOs in response to increased aid flows from foreign donors, but the likelihood of legal restrictions on NGOs nearly doubles if foreign aid flows increase during competitive elections where regimes are most politically vulnerable. These anti-NGO restrictions are often effective and states are able to limit INGO influence in their countries. In the wake of its 2012 Foreign Agents law and 2015 Undesirable Organizations law, which granted the government broad authority to expel NGOs it deemed threatening, dozens of organizations have been shuttered and ejected from Russia. Similarly, @DupuyRonPrakash:2015 find that in response to anti-foreign funding laws passed in 2009, most domestic human rights NGOs in Ethiopia either closed down or rebranded and changed the issues they addressed.
 
@@ -111,8 +111,6 @@ Second, the definition and treatment of NGO restrictions has thus far been somew
 
 Third, what do these anti-NGO laws do to NGOs themselves? How do these laws change organizational behavior and programming? NGOs must balance their normative principles against the instrumental need of organizational survival. NGOs face a tradeoff between mission and money and must pursue both simultaneously [@HeissKelley:2017]—they must "instrumentally pursue their principled objectives within the economic constraints and political opportunity structures imposed by their external environments" [@MitchellSchmitz:2014, 489]. When legal environments are limited and restricted, NGOs face a strain on their stated mission, vision, and values. This strain is particularly acute for international NGOs, which must debate whether to (1) make concessions to authoritarian demands (and potentially compromise their values) to maintain access to the country and carry out their mission, or (2) honor their vision and values, disobey or avoid authoritarian restrictions, and run the risk of expulsion from the country. Exploring how NGOs resolve this existential debate and work around civil society restrictions is worthwhile, and results from these future studies will enable NGOs to better respond to the ongoing expansion of anti-NGO laws in authoritarian states.
 
-[^1]:	Each of the countries discussed in this chapter have been classified as autocracies by @GeddesWrightFrantz:2014 at some point since 1990. Some cases have democratized between 1990 and 2018, but the dynamics of institutional balancing applied prior to transition, and the relationship between state and civil society is still shaped by the country's authoritarian legacy.
+[^1]:	Data comes from @CoppedgeGerringLindberg:2018. Regime type is based on V-Dem's "Regimes of the world" index. I consider all closed autocracies and electoral autocracies as "autocracies"; all other regime types are "democracies."
 
-[^2]:	Data comes from @CoppedgeGerringLindberg:2018. Regime type is based on V-Dem's "Regimes of the world" index. I consider all closed autocracies and electoral autocracies as "autocracies"; all other regime types are "democracies."
-
-[^3]:	Data for Panel A comes from @ChristensenWeinstein:2013, and data for Panel B comes from the "CSO repression" variable in @CoppedgeGerringLindberg:2018, averaged over 1990–2016. CSO repression is measured on a 0–4 scale, with 4 representing the most democratic and open civil society (i.e. no repression) and 0 representing the most restricted civil society (i.e. complete repression and liquidation of civil society). Regime type is determined the same way as @fig:dictator-institutions.
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+[^2]:	Data for Panel A comes from @ChristensenWeinstein:2013, and data for Panel B comes from the "CSO repression" variable in @CoppedgeGerringLindberg:2018, averaged over 1990–2016. CSO repression is measured on a 0–4 scale, with 4 representing the most democratic and open civil society (i.e. no repression) and 0 representing the most restricted civil society (i.e. complete repression and liquidation of civil society). Regime type is determined the same way as @fig:dictator-institutions.
\ No newline at end of file