diff --git a/test/integration-tests/MessageDeadlineCheck.t.sol b/test/integration-tests/MessageDeadlineCheck.t.sol
deleted file mode 100644
index e8dcbc0..0000000
--- a/test/integration-tests/MessageDeadlineCheck.t.sol
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
-pragma solidity >=0.8.9;
-
-/// library imports
-import {Vm} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
-
-/// local imports
-import "test/Setup.t.sol";
-
-import {MultiMessageSender} from "src/MultiMessageSender.sol";
-import {MultiMessageReceiver} from "src/MultiMessageReceiver.sol";
-import {Error} from "src/libraries/Error.sol";
-import {GovernanceTimelock} from "src/controllers/GovernanceTimelock.sol";
-
-/// @dev scenario: demonstrate that a admin-specified deadline is good
-contract MessageDeadlineCheck is Setup {
-    struct TxVars {
-        uint256 txId;
-        address finalTarget;
-        uint256 value;
-        bytes data;
-        uint256 eta;
-    }
-
-    TxVars public adapterRemoveTx;
-    bytes32 public maliciousMsgId;
-
-    /// @dev intializes the setup
-    function setUp() public override {
-        super.setUp();
-    }
-
-    /// @dev just sends a message
-    function test_messageDeadlineCheck() public {
-        vm.selectFork(fork[1]);
-        vm.startPrank(caller);
-
-        /// from chain Ethereum uniswap passes a governance proposal to remove wormhole
-        /// this would fail, since quorum should be reduced before remove adapter
-        _removeAdapter();
-
-        vm.selectFork(fork[1]);
-        vm.startPrank(caller);
-        /// malicious governance actor queues up a malicious tx to re-update wormhole before wormhole
-        /// passes the quorum update proposal through just one message bridge
-        _queueMaliciousAdapterAdd();
-
-        vm.selectFork(fork[1]);
-        vm.startPrank(caller);
-        /// now if uniswap governace queues up the quorum update transaction
-        _quorumUpdateTx();
-
-        /// now the user tries to execute his old msg id which didn't pass quorum
-        /// NOTE: this will revert here; but with a user specified eta / expiry this might pass
-        vm.expectRevert(Error.MSG_EXECUTION_PASSED_DEADLINE.selector);
-        MultiMessageReceiver(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]).executeMessage(maliciousMsgId);
-    }
-
-    function _removeAdapter() internal {
-        address[] memory adaptersToRemove = new address[](1);
-        adaptersToRemove[0] = contractAddress[137]["WORMHOLE_RECEIVER_ADAPTER"];
-
-        /// true = add
-        /// false = remove
-        bool[] memory operation = new bool[](1);
-        operation[0] = false;
-
-        /// send cross-chain message using MMA infra
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        MultiMessageSender(contractAddress[1][bytes("MMA_SENDER")]).remoteCall{value: 2 ether}(
-            137,
-            address(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]),
-            abi.encodeWithSelector(MultiMessageReceiver.updateReceiverAdapter.selector, adaptersToRemove, operation),
-            0,
-            block.timestamp + EXPIRATION_CONSTANT
-        );
-
-        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();
-        vm.stopPrank();
-
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        /// simulate off-chain actors
-        _simulatePayloadDelivery(1, 137, logs);
-        bytes32 msgId = _getMsgId(vm.getRecordedLogs());
-
-        vm.selectFork(fork[137]);
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        /// execute the message and move it to governance timelock contract
-        MultiMessageReceiver(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]).executeMessage(msgId);
-        (uint256 txId, address finalTarget, uint256 value, bytes memory data, uint256 eta) =
-            _getExecParams(vm.getRecordedLogs());
-
-        adapterRemoveTx = TxVars(txId, finalTarget, value, data, eta);
-
-        /// increment the time by 2 day (delay time)
-        vm.warp(block.timestamp + 2 days);
-
-        /// CRITICAL NOTE: reverts due to quorum validation failure.
-        /// this could mess up the quorum.
-        /// If quorum is reduced before removing the colluded receiver, then the non-quorum reached messages could be replayed.
-        vm.expectRevert(Error.EXECUTION_FAILS_ON_DST.selector);
-        GovernanceTimelock(contractAddress[137][bytes("TIMELOCK")]).executeTransaction(
-            txId, finalTarget, value, data, eta
-        );
-    }
-
-    function _queueMaliciousAdapterAdd() internal {
-        address[] memory adaptersToRemove = new address[](1);
-        adaptersToRemove[0] = contractAddress[137]["WORMHOLE_RECEIVER_ADAPTER"];
-
-        /// true = add
-        /// false = remove
-        bool[] memory operation = new bool[](1);
-        operation[0] = false;
-
-        address[] memory excludeAxelar = new address[](1);
-        excludeAxelar[0] = contractAddress[1]["AXELAR_SENDER_ADAPTER"];
-
-        /// send cross-chain message using MMA infra
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        MultiMessageSender(contractAddress[1][bytes("MMA_SENDER")]).remoteCall{value: 2 ether}(
-            137,
-            address(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]),
-            abi.encodeWithSelector(MultiMessageReceiver.updateReceiverAdapter.selector, adaptersToRemove, operation),
-            0,
-            block.timestamp + EXPIRATION_CONSTANT,
-            excludeAxelar
-        );
-
-        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();
-        vm.stopPrank();
-
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        /// simulate off-chain actors
-        _simulatePayloadDelivery(1, 137, logs);
-        maliciousMsgId = _getMsgId(vm.getRecordedLogs());
-
-        vm.selectFork(fork[137]);
-
-        /// execute the message but will fail due to insufficient quorum
-
-        vm.expectRevert(Error.INVALID_QUORUM_FOR_EXECUTION.selector);
-        MultiMessageReceiver(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]).executeMessage(maliciousMsgId);
-    }
-
-    function _quorumUpdateTx() internal {
-        /// send cross-chain message using MMA infra
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        MultiMessageSender(contractAddress[1][bytes("MMA_SENDER")]).remoteCall{value: 2 ether}(
-            137,
-            address(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]),
-            abi.encodeWithSelector(MultiMessageReceiver.updateQuorum.selector, 1),
-            0,
-            block.timestamp + EXPIRATION_CONSTANT
-        );
-
-        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();
-        vm.stopPrank();
-
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        /// simulate off-chain actors
-        _simulatePayloadDelivery(1, 137, logs);
-        bytes32 msgId = _getMsgId(vm.getRecordedLogs());
-
-        vm.selectFork(fork[137]);
-        vm.recordLogs();
-        /// execute the message and move it to governance timelock contract
-        MultiMessageReceiver(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]).executeMessage(msgId);
-        (uint256 txId, address finalTarget, uint256 value, bytes memory data, uint256 eta) =
-            _getExecParams(vm.getRecordedLogs());
-
-        /// increment the time by expiration deadline (delay time)
-        vm.warp(block.timestamp + EXPIRATION_CONSTANT + 1 seconds);
-
-        /// when quorum is updated here
-        GovernanceTimelock(contractAddress[137][bytes("TIMELOCK")]).executeTransaction(
-            txId, finalTarget, value, data, eta
-        );
-    }
-}
diff --git a/test/integration-tests/RemoteAdapterAdd.t.sol b/test/integration-tests/RemoteAdapterAdd.t.sol
index 62ef287..70292f3 100644
--- a/test/integration-tests/RemoteAdapterAdd.t.sol
+++ b/test/integration-tests/RemoteAdapterAdd.t.sol
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ contract RemoteAdapterAdd is Setup {
         );
 
         bool isTrusted = MultiMessageReceiver(contractAddress[137][bytes("MMA_RECEIVER")]).isTrustedExecutor(
-            contractAddress[137]["AXELAR_RECEIVER_ADAPTER"]
+            address(420421422)
         );
         assert(isTrusted);
     }