-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
/
pe.c
946 lines (816 loc) · 27.4 KB
/
pe.c
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
/*
* pe.c - helper functions for pe binaries.
* Copyright Peter Jones <[email protected]>
*/
#include "shim.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dso.h>
#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>
#define check_size_line(data, datasize_in, hashbase, hashsize, l) ({ \
if ((unsigned long)hashbase > \
(unsigned long)data + datasize_in) { \
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; \
perror(L"shim.c:%d Invalid hash base 0x%016x\n", l, \
hashbase); \
goto done; \
} \
if ((unsigned long)hashbase + hashsize > \
(unsigned long)data + datasize_in) { \
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; \
perror(L"shim.c:%d Invalid hash size 0x%016x\n", l, \
hashsize); \
goto done; \
} \
})
#define check_size(d, ds, h, hs) check_size_line(d, ds, h, hs, __LINE__)
/*
* Calculate the SHA1 and SHA256 hashes of a binary
*/
EFI_STATUS
generate_hash(char *data, unsigned int datasize,
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context, UINT8 *sha256hash,
UINT8 *sha1hash)
{
unsigned int sha256ctxsize, sha1ctxsize;
void *sha256ctx = NULL, *sha1ctx = NULL;
char *hashbase;
unsigned int hashsize;
unsigned int SumOfBytesHashed, SumOfSectionBytes;
unsigned int index, pos;
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader = NULL;
EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr = (void *)data;
unsigned int PEHdr_offset = 0;
if (datasize <= sizeof (*DosHdr) ||
DosHdr->e_magic != EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
perror(L"Invalid signature\n");
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
PEHdr_offset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
sha256ctxsize = Sha256GetContextSize();
sha256ctx = AllocatePool(sha256ctxsize);
sha1ctxsize = Sha1GetContextSize();
sha1ctx = AllocatePool(sha1ctxsize);
if (!sha256ctx || !sha1ctx) {
perror(L"Unable to allocate memory for hash context\n");
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
if (!Sha256Init(sha256ctx) || !Sha1Init(sha1ctx)) {
perror(L"Unable to initialise hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
/* Hash start to checksum */
hashbase = data;
hashsize = (char *)&context->PEHdr->Pe32.OptionalHeader.CheckSum -
hashbase;
check_size(data, datasize, hashbase, hashsize);
if (!(Sha256Update(sha256ctx, hashbase, hashsize)) ||
!(Sha1Update(sha1ctx, hashbase, hashsize))) {
perror(L"Unable to generate hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
/* Hash post-checksum to start of certificate table */
hashbase = (char *)&context->PEHdr->Pe32.OptionalHeader.CheckSum +
sizeof (int);
hashsize = (char *)context->SecDir - hashbase;
check_size(data, datasize, hashbase, hashsize);
if (!(Sha256Update(sha256ctx, hashbase, hashsize)) ||
!(Sha1Update(sha1ctx, hashbase, hashsize))) {
perror(L"Unable to generate hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
/* Hash end of certificate table to end of image header */
EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *dd = context->SecDir + 1;
hashbase = (char *)dd;
hashsize = context->SizeOfHeaders - (unsigned long)((char *)dd - data);
if (hashsize > datasize) {
perror(L"Data Directory size %d is invalid\n", hashsize);
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
check_size(data, datasize, hashbase, hashsize);
if (!(Sha256Update(sha256ctx, hashbase, hashsize)) ||
!(Sha1Update(sha1ctx, hashbase, hashsize))) {
perror(L"Unable to generate hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
/* Sort sections */
SumOfBytesHashed = context->SizeOfHeaders;
/*
* XXX Do we need this here, or is it already done in all cases?
*/
if (context->NumberOfSections == 0 ||
context->FirstSection == NULL) {
uint16_t opthdrsz;
uint64_t addr;
uint16_t nsections;
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *section0, *sectionN;
nsections = context->PEHdr->Pe32.FileHeader.NumberOfSections;
opthdrsz = context->PEHdr->Pe32.FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader;
/* Validate section0 is within image */
addr = PEHdr_offset + sizeof(UINT32)
+ sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER)
+ opthdrsz;
section0 = ImageAddress(data, datasize, addr);
if (!section0) {
perror(L"Malformed file header.\n");
perror(L"Image address for Section Header 0 is 0x%016llx\n",
addr);
perror(L"File size is 0x%016llx\n", datasize);
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
/* Validate sectionN is within image */
addr += (uint64_t)(intptr_t)§ion0[nsections-1] -
(uint64_t)(intptr_t)section0;
sectionN = ImageAddress(data, datasize, addr);
if (!sectionN) {
perror(L"Malformed file header.\n");
perror(L"Image address for Section Header %d is 0x%016llx\n",
nsections - 1, addr);
perror(L"File size is 0x%016llx\n", datasize);
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
context->NumberOfSections = nsections;
context->FirstSection = section0;
}
/*
* Allocate a new section table so we can sort them without
* modifying the image.
*/
SectionHeader = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)
* context->NumberOfSections);
if (SectionHeader == NULL) {
perror(L"Unable to allocate section header\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
/*
* Validate section locations and sizes, and sort the table into
* our newly allocated header table
*/
SumOfSectionBytes = 0;
Section = context->FirstSection;
for (index = 0; index < context->NumberOfSections; index++) {
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionPtr;
char *base;
size_t size;
efi_status = get_section_vma(index, data, datasize, context,
&base, &size, &SectionPtr);
if (efi_status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
break;
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Malformed section header\n");
goto done;
}
/* Validate section size is within image. */
if (SectionPtr->SizeOfRawData >
datasize - SumOfBytesHashed - SumOfSectionBytes) {
perror(L"Malformed section %d size\n", index);
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
SumOfSectionBytes += SectionPtr->SizeOfRawData;
pos = index;
while ((pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {
CopyMem (&SectionHeader[pos], &SectionHeader[pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
pos--;
}
CopyMem (&SectionHeader[pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
Section += 1;
}
/* Hash the sections */
for (index = 0; index < context->NumberOfSections; index++) {
Section = &SectionHeader[index];
if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {
continue;
}
hashbase = ImageAddress(data, datasize,
Section->PointerToRawData);
if (!hashbase) {
perror(L"Malformed section header\n");
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
/* Verify hashsize within image. */
if (Section->SizeOfRawData >
datasize - Section->PointerToRawData) {
perror(L"Malformed section raw size %d\n", index);
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
hashsize = (unsigned int) Section->SizeOfRawData;
check_size(data, datasize, hashbase, hashsize);
if (!(Sha256Update(sha256ctx, hashbase, hashsize)) ||
!(Sha1Update(sha1ctx, hashbase, hashsize))) {
perror(L"Unable to generate hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
SumOfBytesHashed += Section->SizeOfRawData;
}
/* Hash all remaining data up to SecDir if SecDir->Size is not 0 */
if (datasize > SumOfBytesHashed && context->SecDir->Size) {
hashbase = data + SumOfBytesHashed;
hashsize = datasize - context->SecDir->Size - SumOfBytesHashed;
if ((datasize - SumOfBytesHashed < context->SecDir->Size) ||
(SumOfBytesHashed + hashsize != context->SecDir->VirtualAddress)) {
perror(L"Malformed binary after Attribute Certificate Table\n");
console_print(L"datasize: %u SumOfBytesHashed: %u SecDir->Size: %lu\n",
datasize, SumOfBytesHashed, context->SecDir->Size);
console_print(L"hashsize: %u SecDir->VirtualAddress: 0x%08lx\n",
hashsize, context->SecDir->VirtualAddress);
efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto done;
}
check_size(data, datasize, hashbase, hashsize);
if (!(Sha256Update(sha256ctx, hashbase, hashsize)) ||
!(Sha1Update(sha1ctx, hashbase, hashsize))) {
perror(L"Unable to generate hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
#if 1
}
#else // we have to migrate to doing this later :/
SumOfBytesHashed += hashsize;
}
/* Hash all remaining data */
if (datasize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
hashbase = data + SumOfBytesHashed;
hashsize = datasize - SumOfBytesHashed;
check_size(data, datasize, hashbase, hashsize);
if (!(Sha256Update(sha256ctx, hashbase, hashsize)) ||
!(Sha1Update(sha1ctx, hashbase, hashsize))) {
perror(L"Unable to generate hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
SumOfBytesHashed += hashsize;
}
#endif
if (!(Sha256Final(sha256ctx, sha256hash)) ||
!(Sha1Final(sha1ctx, sha1hash))) {
perror(L"Unable to finalise hash\n");
efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto done;
}
dprint(L"sha1 authenticode hash:\n");
dhexdumpat(sha1hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
dprint(L"sha256 authenticode hash:\n");
dhexdumpat(sha256hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
done:
if (SectionHeader)
FreePool(SectionHeader);
if (sha1ctx)
FreePool(sha1ctx);
if (sha256ctx)
FreePool(sha256ctx);
return efi_status;
}
EFI_STATUS
verify_sbat_section(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
{
unsigned int i;
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
size_t n;
struct sbat_section_entry **entries = NULL;
char *sbat_data;
size_t sbat_size;
if (list_empty(&sbat_var))
return EFI_SUCCESS;
if (SBATBase == NULL || SBATSize == 0) {
dprint(L"No .sbat section data\n");
/*
* SBAT is mandatory for binaries loaded by shim, but optional
* for binaries loaded outside of shim but verified via the
* protocol.
*/
return in_protocol ? EFI_SUCCESS : EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
if (checked_add(SBATSize, 1, &sbat_size)) {
dprint(L"SBATSize + 1 would overflow\n");
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
sbat_data = AllocatePool(sbat_size);
if (!sbat_data) {
console_print(L"Failed to allocate .sbat section buffer\n");
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
CopyMem(sbat_data, SBATBase, SBATSize);
sbat_data[SBATSize] = '\0';
efi_status = parse_sbat_section(sbat_data, sbat_size, &n, &entries);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Could not parse .sbat section data: %r\n", efi_status);
goto err;
}
dprint(L"SBAT section data\n");
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
dprint(L"%a, %a, %a, %a, %a, %a\n",
entries[i]->component_name,
entries[i]->component_generation,
entries[i]->vendor_name,
entries[i]->vendor_package_name,
entries[i]->vendor_version,
entries[i]->vendor_url);
}
efi_status = verify_sbat(n, entries);
cleanup_sbat_section_entries(n, entries);
err:
FreePool(sbat_data);
return efi_status;
}
static inline uint64_t
shim_mem_attrs_to_uefi_mem_attrs (uint64_t attrs)
{
uint64_t ret = EFI_MEMORY_RP |
EFI_MEMORY_RO |
EFI_MEMORY_XP;
if (attrs & MEM_ATTR_R)
ret &= ~EFI_MEMORY_RP;
if (attrs & MEM_ATTR_W)
ret &= ~EFI_MEMORY_RO;
if (attrs & MEM_ATTR_X)
ret &= ~EFI_MEMORY_XP;
return ret;
}
static inline uint64_t
uefi_mem_attrs_to_shim_mem_attrs (uint64_t attrs)
{
uint64_t ret = MEM_ATTR_R |
MEM_ATTR_W |
MEM_ATTR_X;
if (attrs & EFI_MEMORY_RP)
ret &= ~MEM_ATTR_R;
if (attrs & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
ret &= ~MEM_ATTR_W;
if (attrs & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
ret &= ~MEM_ATTR_X;
return ret;
}
static EFI_STATUS
get_mem_attrs (uintptr_t addr, size_t size, uint64_t *attrs)
{
EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL *proto = NULL;
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS physaddr = addr;
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
efi_status = LibLocateProtocol(&EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL_GUID,
(VOID **)&proto);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !proto)
return efi_status;
if (!IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(physaddr) || !IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(size) || size == 0 || attrs == NULL) {
dprint(L"%a called on 0x%llx-0x%llx and attrs 0x%llx\n",
__func__, (unsigned long long)physaddr,
(unsigned long long)(physaddr+size-1),
attrs);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
efi_status = proto->GetMemoryAttributes(proto, physaddr, size, attrs);
*attrs = uefi_mem_attrs_to_shim_mem_attrs (*attrs);
return efi_status;
}
static EFI_STATUS
update_mem_attrs(uintptr_t addr, uint64_t size,
uint64_t set_attrs, uint64_t clear_attrs)
{
EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL *proto = NULL;
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS physaddr = addr;
EFI_STATUS efi_status, ret;
uint64_t before = 0, after = 0, uefi_set_attrs, uefi_clear_attrs;
efi_status = LibLocateProtocol(&EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL_GUID,
(VOID **)&proto);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !proto)
return efi_status;
efi_status = get_mem_attrs (addr, size, &before);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
dprint(L"get_mem_attrs(0x%llx, 0x%llx, 0x%llx) -> 0x%lx\n",
(unsigned long long)addr, (unsigned long long)size,
&before, efi_status);
if (!IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(physaddr) || !IS_PAGE_ALIGNED(size) || size == 0) {
dprint(L"%a called on 0x%llx-0x%llx (size 0x%llx) +%a%a%a -%a%a%a\n",
__func__, (unsigned long long)physaddr,
(unsigned long long)(physaddr + size - 1),
(unsigned long long)size,
(set_attrs & MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
(set_attrs & MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
(set_attrs & MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
(clear_attrs & MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
(clear_attrs & MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
(clear_attrs & MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "");
return 0;
}
uefi_set_attrs = shim_mem_attrs_to_uefi_mem_attrs (set_attrs);
dprint("translating set_attrs from 0x%lx to 0x%lx\n", set_attrs, uefi_set_attrs);
uefi_clear_attrs = shim_mem_attrs_to_uefi_mem_attrs (clear_attrs);
dprint("translating clear_attrs from 0x%lx to 0x%lx\n", clear_attrs, uefi_clear_attrs);
efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
if (uefi_set_attrs) {
efi_status = proto->SetMemoryAttributes(proto, physaddr, size, uefi_set_attrs);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
dprint(L"Failed to set memory attrs:0x%0x physaddr:0x%llx size:0x%0lx status:%r\n",
uefi_set_attrs, physaddr, size, efi_status);
}
}
if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && uefi_clear_attrs) {
efi_status = proto->ClearMemoryAttributes(proto, physaddr, size, uefi_clear_attrs);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
dprint(L"Failed to clear memory attrs:0x%0x physaddr:0x%llx size:0x%0lx status:%r\n",
uefi_clear_attrs, physaddr, size, efi_status);
}
}
ret = efi_status;
efi_status = get_mem_attrs (addr, size, &after);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
dprint(L"get_mem_attrs(0x%llx, %llu, 0x%llx) -> 0x%lx\n",
(unsigned long long)addr, (unsigned long long)size,
&after, efi_status);
dprint(L"set +%a%a%a -%a%a%a on 0x%llx-0x%llx before:%c%c%c after:%c%c%c\n",
(set_attrs & MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
(set_attrs & MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
(set_attrs & MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
(clear_attrs & MEM_ATTR_R) ? "r" : "",
(clear_attrs & MEM_ATTR_W) ? "w" : "",
(clear_attrs & MEM_ATTR_X) ? "x" : "",
(unsigned long long)addr, (unsigned long long)(addr + size - 1),
(before & MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'r' : '-',
(before & MEM_ATTR_W) ? 'w' : '-',
(before & MEM_ATTR_X) ? 'x' : '-',
(after & MEM_ATTR_R) ? 'r' : '-',
(after & MEM_ATTR_W) ? 'w' : '-',
(after & MEM_ATTR_X) ? 'x' : '-');
return ret;
}
EFI_STATUS verify_image(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li,
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
UINT8 sha1hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
UINT8 sha256hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
/*
* The binary header contains relevant context and section pointers
*/
efi_status = read_header(data, datasize, context);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to read header: %r\n", efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
/*
* Perform the image verification before we start copying data around
* in order to load it.
*/
if (secure_mode()) {
efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize,
context, sha256hash, sha1hash);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
if (verbose)
console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
else
console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
return efi_status;
} else if (verbose)
console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
}
/*
* Calculate the hash for the TPM measurement.
* XXX: We're computing these twice in secure boot mode when the
* buffers already contain the previously computed hashes. Also,
* this is only useful for the TPM1.2 case. We should try to fix
* this in a follow-up.
*/
efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, context, sha256hash,
sha1hash);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
return efi_status;
/* Measure the binary into the TPM */
#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
efi_status =
#endif
tpm_log_pe((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)data, datasize,
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)context->ImageAddress,
li->FilePath, sha1hash, 4);
#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
return efi_status;
}
#endif
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* Once the image has been loaded it needs to be validated and relocated
*/
EFI_STATUS
handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li,
EFI_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT *entry_point,
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *alloc_address,
UINTN *alloc_pages)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
char *buffer;
int i;
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
char *base, *end;
UINT32 size;
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context;
unsigned int alignment, alloc_size;
int found_entry_point = 0;
UINT8 sha1hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
UINT8 sha256hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
/*
* The binary header contains relevant context and section pointers
*/
efi_status = read_header(data, datasize, &context);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to read header: %r\n", efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
/*
* Perform the image verification before we start copying data around
* in order to load it.
*/
if (secure_mode ()) {
efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
sha1hash);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
if (verbose)
console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
else
console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
return efi_status;
} else {
if (verbose)
console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
}
}
/*
* Calculate the hash for the TPM measurement.
* XXX: We're computing these twice in secure boot mode when the
* buffers already contain the previously computed hashes. Also,
* this is only useful for the TPM1.2 case. We should try to fix
* this in a follow-up.
*/
efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
sha1hash);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
return efi_status;
/* Measure the binary into the TPM */
#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
efi_status =
#endif
tpm_log_pe((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)data, datasize,
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)context.ImageAddress,
li->FilePath, sha1hash, 4);
#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
return efi_status;
}
#endif
/* The spec says, uselessly, of SectionAlignment:
* =====
* The alignment (in bytes) of sections when they are loaded into
* memory. It must be greater than or equal to FileAlignment. The
* default is the page size for the architecture.
* =====
* Which doesn't tell you whose responsibility it is to enforce the
* "default", or when. It implies that the value in the field must
* be > FileAlignment (also poorly defined), but it appears visual
* studio will happily write 512 for FileAlignment (its default) and
* 0 for SectionAlignment, intending to imply PAGE_SIZE.
*
* We only support one page size, so if it's zero, nerf it to 4096.
*/
alignment = context.SectionAlignment;
if (!alignment)
alignment = 4096;
alloc_size = ALIGN_VALUE(context.ImageSize + context.SectionAlignment,
PAGE_SIZE);
*alloc_pages = alloc_size / PAGE_SIZE;
efi_status = BS->AllocatePages(AllocateAnyPages, EfiLoaderCode,
*alloc_pages, alloc_address);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to allocate image buffer\n");
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
buffer = (void *)ALIGN_VALUE((unsigned long)*alloc_address, alignment);
dprint(L"Loading 0x%llx bytes at 0x%llx\n",
(unsigned long long)context.ImageSize,
(unsigned long long)(uintptr_t)buffer);
update_mem_attrs((uintptr_t)buffer, alloc_size, MEM_ATTR_R|MEM_ATTR_W,
MEM_ATTR_X);
CopyMem(buffer, data, context.SizeOfHeaders);
/* Flush the instruction cache for the region holding the image */
cache_invalidate(buffer, buffer + context.ImageSize);
*entry_point = ImageAddress(buffer, context.ImageSize, context.EntryPoint);
if (!*entry_point) {
perror(L"Entry point is invalid\n");
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
char *RelocBase, *RelocBaseEnd;
/*
* These are relative virtual addresses, so we have to check them
* against the image size, not the data size.
*/
RelocBase = ImageAddress(buffer, context.ImageSize,
context.RelocDir->VirtualAddress);
/*
* RelocBaseEnd here is the address of the last byte of the table
*/
RelocBaseEnd = ImageAddress(buffer, context.ImageSize,
context.RelocDir->VirtualAddress +
context.RelocDir->Size - 1);
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *RelocSection = NULL;
/*
* Copy the executable's sections to their desired offsets
*/
Section = context.FirstSection;
for (i = 0; i < context.NumberOfSections; i++, Section++) {
/* Don't try to copy discardable sections with zero size */
if ((Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE) &&
!Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
continue;
/*
* Skip sections that aren't marked readable.
*/
if (!(Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ))
continue;
if (!(Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE) &&
(Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE) &&
(Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE) &&
(mok_policy & MOK_POLICY_REQUIRE_NX)) {
perror(L"Section %d is writable and executable\n", i);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
base = ImageAddress (buffer, context.ImageSize,
Section->VirtualAddress);
end = ImageAddress (buffer, context.ImageSize,
Section->VirtualAddress
+ Section->Misc.VirtualSize - 1);
if (end < base) {
perror(L"Section %d has negative size\n", i);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (Section->VirtualAddress <= context.EntryPoint &&
(Section->VirtualAddress + Section->Misc.VirtualSize - 1)
> context.EntryPoint)
found_entry_point++;
/* We do want to process .reloc, but it's often marked
* discardable, so we don't want to memcpy it. */
if (CompareMem(Section->Name, ".reloc\0\0", 8) == 0) {
if (RelocSection) {
perror(L"Image has multiple relocation sections\n");
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
/* If it has nonzero sizes, and our bounds check
* made sense, and the VA and size match RelocDir's
* versions, then we believe in this section table. */
if (Section->SizeOfRawData &&
Section->Misc.VirtualSize &&
base && end &&
RelocBase == base &&
RelocBaseEnd <= end) {
RelocSection = Section;
} else {
perror(L"Relocation section is invalid \n");
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
}
if (Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE) {
continue;
}
if (!base) {
perror(L"Section %d has invalid base address\n", i);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (!end) {
perror(L"Section %d has zero size\n", i);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (!(Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA) &&
(Section->VirtualAddress < context.SizeOfHeaders ||
Section->PointerToRawData < context.SizeOfHeaders)) {
perror(L"Section %d is inside image headers\n", i);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA) {
ZeroMem(base, Section->Misc.VirtualSize);
} else {
if (Section->PointerToRawData < context.SizeOfHeaders) {
perror(L"Section %d is inside image headers\n", i);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
size = Section->Misc.VirtualSize;
if (size > Section->SizeOfRawData)
size = Section->SizeOfRawData;
if (size > 0)
CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData, size);
if (size < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
ZeroMem(base + size, Section->Misc.VirtualSize - size);
}
}
if (context.NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC) {
perror(L"Image has no relocation entry\n");
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (context.RelocDir->Size && RelocSection) {
/*
* Run the relocation fixups
*/
efi_status = relocate_coff(&context, RelocSection, data,
buffer);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Relocation failed: %r\n", efi_status);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return efi_status;
}
}
/*
* Now set the page permissions appropriately.
*/
Section = context.FirstSection;
for (i = 0; i < context.NumberOfSections; i++, Section++) {
uint64_t set_attrs = MEM_ATTR_R;
uint64_t clear_attrs = MEM_ATTR_W|MEM_ATTR_X;
uintptr_t addr;
uint64_t length;
/*
* Skip discardable sections with zero size
*/
if ((Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE) &&
!Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
continue;
/*
* Skip sections that aren't marked readable.
*/
if (!(Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ))
continue;
base = ImageAddress (buffer, context.ImageSize,
Section->VirtualAddress);
end = ImageAddress (buffer, context.ImageSize,
Section->VirtualAddress
+ Section->Misc.VirtualSize - 1);
addr = (uintptr_t)base;
// Align the length up to PAGE_SIZE. This is required because
// platforms generally set memory attributes at page
// granularity, but the section length (unlike the section
// address) is not required to be aligned.
length = ALIGN_VALUE((uintptr_t)end - (uintptr_t)base + 1, PAGE_SIZE);
if (Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE) {
set_attrs |= MEM_ATTR_W;
clear_attrs &= ~MEM_ATTR_W;
}
if (Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE) {
set_attrs |= MEM_ATTR_X;
clear_attrs &= ~MEM_ATTR_X;
}
update_mem_attrs(addr, length, set_attrs, clear_attrs);
}
/*
* grub needs to know its location and size in memory, so fix up
* the loaded image protocol values
*/
li->ImageBase = buffer;
li->ImageSize = context.ImageSize;
/* Pass the load options to the second stage loader */
li->LoadOptions = load_options;
li->LoadOptionsSize = load_options_size;
if (!found_entry_point) {
perror(L"Entry point is not within sections\n");
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (found_entry_point > 1) {
perror(L"%d sections contain entry point\n", found_entry_point);
BS->FreePages(*alloc_address, *alloc_pages);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
// vim:fenc=utf-8:tw=75:noet