diff --git a/.github/linter/base_style.rb b/.github/linter/base_style.rb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d98105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/linter/base_style.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+all
+# lame rules
+exclude_rule 'MD002'
+exclude_rule 'MD041'
diff --git a/.github/linter/readme_style.rb b/.github/linter/readme_style.rb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02e6b48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/linter/readme_style.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+all
+# allow inline HTML for README fmt
+exclude_rule 'MD033'
+# badges trigger rule
+exclude_rule 'MD034'
+# README img serves as 'First Header'
+exclude_rule 'MD002'
+exclude_rule 'MD041'
+# TODO: disable/enable not working for all-contribs
+exclude_rule 'MD013'
+# Allow no endline at the end
+exclude_rule 'MD047'
diff --git a/.tool-versions b/.tool-versions
index f239fe2..045dc3e 100644
--- a/.tool-versions
+++ b/.tool-versions
@@ -1 +1 @@
-scarb 2.6.3
+scarb 2.7.0
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 511c794..10129cb 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -37,3 +37,38 @@ This will compile all the components.
 ```bash
 scarb test
 ```
+
+## Scheme description
+
+Taken from [RubenSomsen blind ecash Gist](https://gist.github.com/RubenSomsen/be7a4760dd4596d06963d67baf140406).
+
+The goal of this protocol is for Bob to get Alice to perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange blindly, such that when the unblinded value is returned, Alice recognizes it as her own, but can’t distinguish it from others (i.e. similar to a blind signature).
+
+```text
+Alice:
+A = a*G
+return A
+
+Bob:
+Y = hash_to_curve(secret_message)
+r = random blinding factor
+B'= Y + r*G
+return B'
+
+Alice:
+C' = a*B'
+  (= a*Y + a*r*G)
+return C'
+
+Bob:
+C = C' - r*A
+ (= C' - a*r*G)
+ (= a*Y)
+return C, secret_message
+
+Alice:
+Y = hash_to_curve(secret_message)
+C == a*Y
+
+If true, C must have originated from Alice
+```
diff --git a/Scarb.toml b/Scarb.toml
index 66b4d88..1c8e544 100644
--- a/Scarb.toml
+++ b/Scarb.toml
@@ -4,3 +4,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 edition = "2023_11"
 
 [dependencies]
+starknet = "2.7.0"
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+cairo_test = "2.7.0"
diff --git a/src/core.cairo b/src/core.cairo
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b87818b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/core.cairo
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+// Core lib imports
+use core::traits::Into;
+use core::option::OptionTrait;
+use core::starknet::SyscallResultTrait;
+use core::sha256::compute_sha256_byte_array;
+
+// Starknet imports
+use starknet::{secp256k1::{Secp256k1Point}, secp256_trait::{Secp256Trait, Secp256PointTrait}};
+
+
+const TWO_POW_32: u128 = 0x100000000;
+const TWO_POW_64: u128 = 0x10000000000000000;
+const TWO_POW_96: u128 = 0x1000000000000000000000000;
+
+/// Represents the Mint (Bob) in the BDHKE protocol
+#[derive(Destruct)]
+pub struct Mint {
+    pub k: u256, // Private key of the mint
+    pub K: Secp256k1Point, // Public key of the mint
+}
+
+/// Represents a User (Alice or Carol) in the BDHKE protocol
+#[derive(Destruct)]
+pub struct User {
+    /// Secret message
+    pub x: u256,
+    /// Point on the curve corresponding to x
+    pub Y: Secp256k1Point,
+    /// Blinding factor (private key for blinding)
+    pub r: u256,
+}
+
+/// Implements the Mint functionality
+#[generate_trait()]
+pub impl MintTraitImpl of MintTrait {
+    /// Creates a new Mint with a random private key
+    fn new(k: u256) -> Mint {
+        let K = Secp256Trait::<Secp256k1Point>::get_generator_point().mul(k).unwrap_syscall();
+        Mint { k, K }
+    }
+
+    /// Signs a blinded message
+    ///
+    /// # Arguments
+    /// * `B_` - The blinded message point
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// The blinded signature point C_
+    fn sign(ref self: Mint, B_: Secp256k1Point) -> Secp256k1Point {
+        B_.mul(self.k).unwrap_syscall()
+    }
+
+    /// Verifies a token
+    ///
+    /// # Arguments
+    /// * `x` - The secret message
+    /// * `C` - The unblinded signature point
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// True if the token is valid, false otherwise
+    fn verify(self: Mint, x: u256, C: Secp256k1Point) -> bool {
+        let Y = hash_to_curve(x);
+        let expected_C_coordinates = Y
+            .mul(self.k)
+            .unwrap_syscall()
+            .get_coordinates()
+            .unwrap_syscall();
+        let c_coordinates = C.get_coordinates().unwrap_syscall();
+        expected_C_coordinates == c_coordinates
+    }
+}
+
+/// Implements the User functionality
+#[generate_trait()]
+pub impl UserTraitImpl of UserTrait {
+    /// Creates a new User with a random secret message and blinding factor
+    fn new(x: u256, r: u256) -> User {
+        let Y = hash_to_curve(x);
+        User { x, Y, r }
+    }
+
+    /// Blinds the message
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// The blinded message point B_
+    fn blind(ref self: User) -> Secp256k1Point {
+        let G = Secp256Trait::<Secp256k1Point>::get_generator_point();
+        self.Y.add(G.mul(self.r).unwrap_syscall()).unwrap_syscall()
+    }
+
+    /// Unblinds the signature
+    ///
+    /// # Arguments
+    /// * `C_` - The blinded signature point
+    /// * `K` - The mint's public key
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// The unblinded signature point C
+    fn unblind(ref self: User, C_: Secp256k1Point, K: Secp256k1Point) -> Secp256k1Point {
+        C_.add(K.mul(self.r).unwrap_syscall()).unwrap_syscall()
+    }
+
+    /// Creates a token
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// A tuple containing the secret message and the unblinded signature point
+    fn create_token(ref self: User, C: Secp256k1Point) -> (u256, Secp256k1Point) {
+        (self.x, C)
+    }
+}
+
+
+/// Hashes a message to a point on the secp256k1 curve
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `message` - The message to hash
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// A point on the secp256k1 curve
+pub fn hash_to_curve(message: u256) -> Secp256k1Point {
+    // This is a simplified implementation. In practice, you should use a more
+    // robust method to ensure the resulting point is uniformly distributed.
+    let mut attempt = 0;
+    loop {
+        let hash_input = message * TWO_POW_32.into() + attempt.into();
+        let hash_result = compute_hash(hash_input);
+        match Secp256Trait::<
+            Secp256k1Point
+        >::secp256_ec_get_point_from_x_syscall(hash_result, false) {
+            Result::Ok(point_option) => {
+                match point_option {
+                    Option::Some(point) => { break point; },
+                    Option::None => { attempt += 1; }
+                }
+            },
+            Result::Err(_) => { attempt += 1; }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Computes a hash of the input
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `input` - The input to hash
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// The hash result as a u256
+pub fn compute_hash(input: u256) -> u256 {
+    let hash_result = compute_sha256_byte_array(@input.into());
+    let mut value: u256 = 0;
+    let hash_result_span = hash_result.span();
+    let len = hash_result_span.len();
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < len {
+        let word = hash_result_span[i];
+        value *= 0x100000000;
+        value = value + (*word).into();
+        i += 1;
+    };
+    value
+}
+
+pub impl U256IntoByteArray of Into<u256, ByteArray> {
+    fn into(self: u256) -> ByteArray {
+        let mut ba = Default::default();
+        ba.append_word(self.high.into(), 16);
+        ba.append_word(self.low.into(), 16);
+        ba
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/lib.cairo b/src/lib.cairo
index d18669a..ec8e997 100644
--- a/src/lib.cairo
+++ b/src/lib.cairo
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 mod main;
+pub mod core;
diff --git a/src/main.cairo b/src/main.cairo
index 061e9d2..ffea198 100644
--- a/src/main.cairo
+++ b/src/main.cairo
@@ -1,3 +1,43 @@
+use bdhke::core::MintTrait;
+use bdhke::core::MintTraitImpl;
+use bdhke::core::UserTrait;
+use bdhke::core::UserTraitImpl;
+use starknet::{secp256k1::{Secp256k1Point}, secp256_trait::{Secp256Trait, Secp256PointTrait}};
+use core::starknet::SyscallResultTrait;
+
 fn main() {
     println!("Running Blind Diffie-Hellmann Key Exchange (BDHKE) scheme");
+
+    // Create a mint (Bob)
+    let mint_private_key: u256 = 0xe907831f80848d1069a5371b402410364bdf1c5f8307b0084c55f1ce2dca8215;
+    let mut mint = MintTraitImpl::new(mint_private_key);
+
+    // Create a user (Alice)
+    let alice_random_secret: u256 =
+        0xe907831f80848d1069a5371b402410364bdf1c5f8307b0084c55f1ce2dca8215;
+    let alice_blinding_factor: u256 =
+        0xe907831f80848d1069a5371b402410364bdf1c5f8307b0084c55f1ce2dca8215;
+
+    let mut alice = UserTraitImpl::new(alice_random_secret, alice_blinding_factor);
+
+    // Alice blinds her message
+    let B_ = alice.blind();
+
+    // Mint signs the blinded message
+    let C_ = mint.sign(B_);
+
+    // Alice unblinds the signature
+    let C = alice.unblind(C_, mint.K);
+
+    // Alice creates a token
+    let (x, C) = alice.create_token(C);
+
+    // Mint verifies the token
+    let is_valid = mint.verify(x, C);
+
+    if is_valid {
+        println!("Token is valid");
+    } else {
+        println!("Token is invalid");
+    }
 }